Integration of Landlocked Countries into the Global Economy and Domestic Economic Reforms: The case of Lao People’s Democratic Republic by Donald J. Lewis
Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade 
 
Working Paper Series, No 58, August 2008 
 
 
I In nt te eg gr ra at ti io on n   o of f   L La an nd dl lo oc ck ke ed d   C Co ou un nt tr ri ie es s   i in nt to o   t th he e   G Gl lo ob ba al l   
E Ec co on no om my y   a an nd d   D Do om me es st ti ic c   E Ec co on no om mi ic c   R Re ef fo or rm ms s: :   T Th he e   c ca as se e   o of f   L La ao o   
P Pe eo op pl le e’ ’s s   D De em mo oc cr ra at ti ic c   R Re ep pu ub bl li ic c       
 
By  






*is Associate Processor, Faculty of Law, Hong Kong University (HKU), Hong Kong, China. The opinion 
figures and estimates are the responsibility of the author and should not be considered as reflecting the 
views or carrying the approval of the United Nations, ARTNeT, HKU. Any remaining errors are the 




The Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade (ARTNeT) aims at building 
regional trade policy and facilitation research capacity in developing countries. The ARTNeT 
Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange 
of ideas about trade issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if 
the presentations are less than fully polished. ARTNeT working papers are available online at: 
www.artnetontrade.org. All material in the working papers may be freely quoted or reprinted, 
but acknowledgment is requested, together with a copy of the publication containing the 
quotation or reprint. The use of the working papers for any commercial purpose, including 
resale, is prohibited. 
  




I. Overview of the Laos WTO Accession Process: Challenges..........................................5 





TRIMs, SCM and Other FDI-related Aspects...................................................................13 
Freedom of Transit and Related Issues.............................................................................18 
Other Challenges Outlined................................................................................................20 
II. Domestic Reform Process and WTO Accession: Linkages........................................21 
Institutional Arrangements................................................................................................22 
FDI Policies ......................................................................................................................25 
Role of “Landlockedness”................................................................................................30 
Lessons and “Good Practices” from Nepal.......................................................................31 








  2 
 Abbreviations 
 
ADB      Asian Development Bank 
AFAS       Framework  Agreement  on  Services 
A F T A              A E A N   F r e e   T r a d e   A r e a  
A I A                A S E A N   I n v e s t m e n t   A r e a  
A P A               A l m a t y   P r o g r a m m e   o f   A c t i o n  
APTA             Asia-Pacific  Trade  Agreement 
ARTNeT            Asia-Pacific  Research  and  Training  Network  on  Trade  
ASCM            Agreement  on  Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
ASEAN      Association of South East Asian Nations 
C B                C a p a c i t y   B u i l d i n g  
C B T A              G M S   C r o s s - B o r d e r   T r a n s p o r t   A g r e e m e n t  
C P M I              C o m m i t t e e   f o r   Promotion and Management of Investment 
CPIA               Country  Policy  and  Institutional  Assessment 
CV               Countervailing 
D D A               D o h a   D e v e l o p m e n t   A g e n d a  
DONLUPAD       Department  of  National  Land  Use  Planning  and  Development 
E C                 E u r o p e a n   C o m m i s s i o n  
F D I                F o r e i g n   D i r e c t   I n v e s t m e n t  
GATS             General  Agreement  on  Trade  in  Services 
GATT  1994        General  Agreement  on  Tariff  and  Trade  1994 
GMS             Greater  Mekong  Subregion 
GSP              Generalized  System  of  Preferences 
I A I                I n i t i a t i v e   f o r   A S E A N   I n t e g r a t i o n  
ICT               Information  and  Communication  Technology 
I D A                I n t e r n a t i o n a l   D e v e l o p m e n t   A s s o c i a t i o n  
ITA               Information  Technology  Agreement 
I T C                I n t e r n a t i o n a l   T r a d e   C e n t e r  
Lao  PDR           Lao  People’s  Democratic  Republic 
LDC              Least-Developed  Country 
LPDI              Law  on  the  Promotion  of  Domestic  Investment 
LPFI              Law  on  the  Promotion  of  Foreign  Investment 
MOIC             Ministry  of  Industry  and  Commerce  of  Lao  PDR 
M F N               M o s t - F a v o r e d   N a t i o n   T r e a t m e n t  
N A M A             N o n - A g r i c u l t u r a l   M a r k e t   A c c e s s  
  3 
 N E M               N e w   E c o n o m i c   M e c h a n i s m  
N G P E S             N a t i o n a l   G r o w th and Poverty Eradication Strategy 
NGTF             Negotiation  Group  on  Trade  Facilitation 
N L P C              N a t i o n a l   L a n d   P o l i c y   C o m m i t t e e  
N S C               N a t i o n a l   S t e e r i n g   C o m m i t t e e  
NSEDP            National  Socio-Economic  Development  Plan 
N T B               N o n - T a r i f f   B a r r i e r  
NTC              National  Trade  and  Transport  Facilitation  Committee 
OECD             Organization  for Economic Cooperation and Development 
S & D Treatment        Special and Differential Treatment 
S M E               S m a l l - a n d - m e d i u m - s i z e d   E n t e r p r i s e  
SPS               Agreement  on  the  Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures 
T A                 T e c h n i c a l   A s s i s t a n c e  
TBT              Agreement  on  Technical  Barrier  to  Trade 
TRIMs            Agreement  on  Trade-related  Investment  Measures 
T R I P s              A g r e e m e n t   o n   T r a d e -related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
U N                U n i t e d   N a t i o n s  
UNCTAD         United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development 
UNDP            United  Nations  Development  Programme 
UNESCAP         United  Nations  Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific 
U S                T h e   U n i t e d   S t a t e s  
V A T               V a l u e   A d d e d   T a x  
W B               W o r l d   B a n k  











  4 
 Introduction 
The special needs and difficulties of landlocked countries as they seek to achieve 
integration into the global economy have been increasingly recognized by the international 
community as requiring particular attention. Correspondingly, the proper mix of domestic 
policies and trade policy reforms for landlocked countries present a complicated agenda 
due to the inevitable requirements of economic structural adjustment and improved market 
access required for effective global integration. The Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
(Lao PDR), now in the midst of its accession to the WTO, provides a useful platform to 
identify and analyze such needs and difficulties as well as what may or may not be 
appropriate corresponding reforms.   
 
In this report, Laos’ challenges encountered as part of the WTO accession process 
will be surveyed. Subsequently, the linkages between Laos’ domestic reform processes and 
WTO accession will be analyzed, with a particular focus on certain key sectors and 
institutional arrangements. Based upon foregoing, policy recommendations for the Lao 
PDR government and regional and international organizations, particularly, UNESCAP will 
be presented in the conclusion to this report. Throughout this report, the status of Laos as a 
landlocked country and a least developed country (LDC) are stressed as giving rise to 
special considerations and policy responses.   
I. Overview of the Laos WTO Accession Process: Challenges 
Since 1986, which marks the beginning of international economic integration and 
domestic economic reforms for Lao PDR, the Lao government has endeavored to 
implement an “open door” policy and to transition from a centrally-planned to a 
market-oriented economy. In this regard, the Lao PDR government has adopted a series of 
measures to propel its integration into the global economy, the most significant of which 
have been Laos’ accession to ASEAN, as well as to the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), 
on 23 July 1997. In order to implement ASEAN and AFTA, the Lao reform and integration 
process has been accelerated and has brought about, on the whole, substantial benefits to 
the country, which have in turn spurred the Lao government to adopt policies in favor of 
increasing integration into the global trading and WTO systems.   
 
In July 1997, Lao PDR submitted its request for WTO accession. In February 1998, 
the Working Party on Accession by Lao PDR (WPAL) was established. In March 2001, the 
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 Lao PDR government lodged its Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime with the WTO. 
Subsequently, the WPAL has held three meetings: October 2004, July 2006 and November 
2007. The Lao PDR government answered 263 questions in the first meeting and 101 
questions in the second meeting, which covered agricultural subsidies, SPS and TBT, 
TRIPs, the Laos’ Legislative Action Plan and an initial offer on goods. On 9 July 2007, in 
preparation for the third WPAL meeting in November 2007, the third set of questions and 
answers were submitted, covering Laos’ action plans on customs valuation, SPS, TBT and 
TRIPs, the revised Legislative Action Plan and an initial offer on services.   
 
In spite of the success of its WTO accession negotiations to date and its 
continuing efforts to achieve international economic integration, Lao PDR, as an LDC as 
well as a landlocked country, is still confronted with a range of significant challenges, not 
only due to the external pressures derived from the accession process and the requests of 
WTO Member demandeurs, but also arising internally from Lao domestic interest groups 
and other sources. 
Two Sources of Challenges 
On one hand, the challenges posed by WTO accession are partly external. Strictly 
speaking, the difficulties Lao PDR faces in its WTO accession directly derive from 
accession requirements themselves; in other words, these are external, rather than internal, 
challenges and are, consequently, more direct and more easily accommodated. The WTO 
accession process consists of four stages: (1) fact-finding, (2) bilateral negotiations, (3) 
drafting of the terms of accession, and (4) decision and ratification. Currently, Laos’ WTO 
accession remains at the early stage as regards “fact finding”. At this stage, Laos must 
report to the WTO all aspects of its trade and economic policies that have a bearing on 
compliance with the WTO agreements. At the next stage, Lao PDR will undertake bilateral 
negotiations with individual WTO Members, respectively. Such a process leads to two basic 
outcomes: (1) adapting/ adjusting domestic laws and regulations to meet the fundamental 
obligations of the WTO agreements; and (2) negotiating with WTO Members on tariff rates 
and specific market access commitments, as well as on other policies affecting trade in 
goods and services. Such external pressures and their related challenges have and will 
continue to impact significantly on Lao PDR’s institutional arrangements as well as on 
trade and domestic policy and legal systems. 
 
On the other hand, Lao PDR, particularly as an LDC and landlocked country, 
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 lacks adequate capacity to respond fully to such external pressures and demands and their 
concomitant challenges. Lack of territorial access to the sea, remoteness and isolation from 
world markets aggravates Lao poverty, substantially inflates transportation costs and lowers 
its overall participation in the global economy. Moreover, its exports are heavily dependent 
on certain commodities. Such incapacity also contributes to a range of domestic 
weaknesses and shortages that makes it difficult for Laos to fulfill WTO market access 
requirements. As the Laos’ Vice Minister of Industry and Commerce, Mrs. Khemmani 
Pholsena evaluated, the WTO accession negotiations are and will be “highly technical, 
lengthy and painful”
1 for the Lao PDR government. For Lao PDR, such internal challenges 
come from the country’s longer-term deficiencies, which are rooted in the Lao PDR policy 
environment and domestic institutional arrangements as well as the organization of the 
national economy. In this sense, the internal challenges facing Lao PDR are more 
fundamental and systematic and, consequently, more difficult to overcome than external 
challenges. 
 
The following sections of this report will consider certain key current challenges 
which Laos faces as a result of its WTO accession drive from both external and internal 
perspectives. 
Institutional Arrangements 
The external aspect of institutional arrangements which Lao PDR faces in 
connection with WTO accession derive primarily from GATT 1994 Article X and GATS 
Article III, which require publication and administration of trade regulations. GATT 1994 
Articles X:1 and 2 as well as GATS Articles III:1 and 2 impose transparency obligations 
upon WTO Members as regards the publishing all trade laws, regulations, judicial decisions 
and administrative rulings of general application, and inter-governmental agreements 
affecting international trade policies. Moreover, Article X:3(a) requires WTO Members to 
administer laws in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner. Finally, in order to 
promptly review and correct administrative action relating to customs matters, Article 
X:3(b) and (c) requires WTO Members to maintain or establish independent, objective and 
impartial remedial procedures through which enforceable decisions should be made. 
 
                                                 
1 See Section V in Mrs., Khemmani Pholsena, Laos’ Accession to the WTO: Progress and Way Forward, 
presentation on National Workshop: Trade Policy Opportunities and Development Challenges, 17-18 July 
2007. 
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 However, there still exist internal weaknesses in Lao PDR, as represented by the Lao 
incapacity to meet external WTO requirements on such institutional arrangements, 
especially Laos’ government management and institutions. As the following Table I:1 
shows, according to the World Bank (WB) authoritative Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment or CPIA in 2006, the Lao relevant IDA Resource Allocation Index is overall 
below the average level of IDA borrowers, which indicates that the Lao PDR development 




Table I: 2006 Laos’ IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) in Public Sector 
Management and Institutions 
 
Item  Lao PDR  Average IDA Borrowers 
Property Rights and 
Rule-based Governance 
3.0 2.9 
Quality of Budgetary and 
Financial Management 
3.0 3.2 
Efficiency of Revenue 
Mobilization 
2.5 3.4 





Corruption in the Public 
Sector 
2.0 2.9 
Average 2.7  3.1 
Source: IDA, 2006 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,menuPK:51235940~pagePK:11864
4~piPK:51236156~theSitePK:73154,00.html (last visited on 13 November 2007). 
First, the Lao government lacks sufficient transparency with respect to publication 
of its trade-related policies and laws. Potential foreign and domestic investors and traders 
                                                 
2 International Development Association or IDA is part of the World Bank that helps the world’s poorest 
countries by lending. The main factor that determines the allocation of IDA resources among eligible 
countries is each country’s performance in implementing policies that promote economic growth and poverty 
reduction. This is assessed by the CPIA. In CPIA, the overall country score is referred to as the IDA Resource 
Allocation Index (IRAI). So, IRAI indicates the policy performance of the world’s poorest countries as the 
borrowers of IDA. See details on the IDA website at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,menuPK:51235940~pagePK:11864
4~piPK:51236156~theSitePK:73154,00.html (last visited on 13 November 2007). 
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 currently still encounter difficulties in accessing information about the Lao PDR trade 
regime. Moreover, laws and regulations in written are still not the same as those in practice: 
during implementation, procedures and substantive rules seem more liberal. In other words, 
in Lao PDR, unpredictability and non-transparency exist not only in terms of what is 
published and publicly available in writing, but also as regards actual practices. It may 
further be concluded from the WB findings in Table I:1 that transparency, accountability 
and, perhaps, corruption in the Lao public sector are sub-optimal, even as compared with 
other items in that table. 
 
Second, Lao PDR domestic line agencies are not well-coordinated with the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MOIC) of Lao PDR, as this lack of coordination was 
amongst the principal reasons delaying the progress of the Lao accession. The MOIC, as 
the coordinating agency for the Lao WTO accession, takes overall responsibility for 
distributing WPAL-generated questions to the line agencies concerned. However, some line 
agencies were unable to provide appropriate replies to the questions while others appeared 
to have a lack of understanding of WTO rules and principles. What the Lao government 
needed was a coordination system to prepare responses to the questions and then to forward 
them to the relevant line agencies for feedback (this coordination system has in fact been 
subsequently established). Another example of problems concerning the uniform 
application of administration of trade policy is Laos’ customs administration, which is 
decentralized, and customs procedures which are not applied uniformly across provinces. 
This lack of inter-agency coordination detrimentally impacts on the efficiency of revenue 
mobilization, the quality of budgetary and financial management as well as on overall 
public administration, as the above WB Table shows.   
 
Finally, although commercial courts were recently introduced, Lao PDR has not 
established administrative tribunals to date. A certain number of cases concerning the civil 
responsibility of the State are dealt with by the courts. Arbitration was recently 
institutionalized under the Ministry of Justice, with two sub-centers in Luang Prabang and 
Savannakhet. At present, Lao PDR still does not have legislation which provides specific 
rights of appeal against actions by government bodies in the trade area.  Rights of appeal 
generally are implemented through administrative procedure by lodging complaints with 
the Prime Minister’s Office, and in a number of areas, procedures establish 
officially-recognized rights. However, it is still doubtful whether such a complaint 
procedure meets the requirements of objectivity and impartiality set forth in Article X:3, 
especially in light of reports of bribery and other corrupt practices by officials involved in 
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 customs.
3Accordingly, it may be seen that rule of law in governance in Laos, although 
having improved dramatically in recent years as stated in Part II of this report, remains at 
the intermediate level of the poorest countries in the world. 
Agriculture Issues 
Under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, market access in agricultural products 
can only be subject to tariffs and tariff-rate quotas. All other quantitative restrictions on 
imports should be subject to “tariffication”, pursuant to GATT 1994 Article XI requiring 
general elimination of quantitative restrictions. Recently, in the Doha Round negotiations, 
WTO Members have engaged in renewed negotiations on further liberalized market access 
commitments for agricultural products, especially sensitive agricultural products. One of 
the possible compromises tabled is to raise tariff-rate quotas for sensitive products and 
lower out-of-quota tariffs. However, such a trend challenges Laos’ current import regulation 
system on agricultural products. Previously, Lao PDR relied heavily on restrictive import 
measures to control in-bound agricultural trade. One of major areas covered by prior Lao 
import quotas has been sensitive agricultural products. At present, although reforms are 
proceeding, many sensitive agricultural products in Lao PDR are still subject import 
quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff barriers, except tariff-rate quotas. Given the 
requirements of GATT 1994, the WTO Agreement of Agriculture and the Doha Round 
negotiations, it will be necessary, but challenging, for Lao PDR to set up a system of 
tariff-rate quotas to replace other existing non-tariff barriers to market access for 
agricultural products. On the other hand, there is also good news for Lao PDR. As an LDC, 
Lao PDR need not lower their agricultural tariffs at all, and should enjoy special treatment 
on food aid and aid for agricultural development according to a special Ministerial 
Decision
4 made pursuant to Article 16, WTO  Agreement  on  Agriculture.   
 
As for agricultural subsidies, during the Uruguay Round, GATT contracting 
parties agreed to reduce trade-distorting domestic support that was being provided above a 
de minimis level which is 10 percent of the total level of production for developing 
countries and 5 percent for others. Laos’ WTO negotiations will likely revolve around 
whether Laos will bind export subsidies at zero and commit to keeping trade-distorting 
                                                 
3 See United Nations, An Exploration of the Need for and Cost of Selected TF Measures in Asia and the 
Pacific in the Context of the WTO Negotiations, 40 (Thailand: United Nations Publication, 2006). 
4 See G/AG/W/42/Rev.7. 
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 domestic support that the government might introduce in the future below a certain 
threshold. Such a commitment also depends upon the results of the Doha Round 
negotiations concerning the base period for Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) and 
percent reductions for trade-distorting support. 
NAMA 
Under GATT 1994, besides the aforesaid agricultural products, non-agricultural 
products are also subject to market access requirements as regards import tariff bindings as 
well as the general elimination of quantitative restrictions. Specifically, in the Doha Round, 
NAMA is being treated as a specific and separate area for negotiation. However, Lao PDR 
still imposes significant tariffs on a wide range of non-agricultural products which will need 
to be reduced and a host of non-tariff restrictions will also need to be eliminated through 
impending bilateral negotiations. In Lao PDR, import business registration is the 
prerequisite for import, which actually limits trading rights and is inconsistent with GATT 
1994. Moreover, Laos’ coverage of goods subject to import prohibition or import controls is 
over-broad, some of which measures may not survive scrutiny under Article XI and its 
exceptions in GATT 1994. Third, under Laos’ current Indicative Plan, importers still need 
to provide an annual import plan in value terms to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce 
(MOIC) which will be forwarded to the border check point and be deducted against each 
imported shipment, otherwise traders can not perform importation. Such restrictions are 
intrinsically inconsistent with the WTO spirit of free trade. It is doubtful whether such 
measures may be justified by the Article XVIII GATT 1994 exception on balance of 
payments. On the other hand, the 1979 Enabling Clause accords developing countries with 
special and differential treatment (S&DT). Developed countries should not expect 
reciprocal treatment from developing countries. This may reduce the impact of developed 
countries’ market access limitations on Laos’ strategic export industries, such as the textile 
industry, post-accession. Moreover, in the ongoing Doha Round negotiations, the NAMA 
Negotiating Group Chair has proposed Paragraph 6 flexibilities for LDCs and 
recent-acceded Members concerning NAMA. If finalized, this could provide a good 
cushion for the NAMA impact on Lao PDR for its accession as well. Finally, the General 
Council’s Decision on LDC accessions recognizes the special needs of LDCs and calls for 
additional flexibilities so as to facilitate their involvement in trade in goods negotiations as 
well as liberalization.   
There are also two inter-linked issues. The first is whether Lao PDR would be 
required to join the plurilateral agreement, Information Technology Agreement (ITA), 
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 which requires participants’ zero import tariffs on listed information technology products. 
As regards the second challenge, Lao PDR may be requested by some WTO Members to 
“multilateralize” its past preferential liberalizations pursuant to regional and bilateral 
agreements. The legal basis for such a demand is Article 1, GATT 1994. However, the MFN 
exception set forth in GATT Article XXIV and the 1979 Enabling Clause may provide some 
flexibility for Lao PDR in preserving certain preferential arrangements at both the 
multilateral and regional levels.   
Services 
Generally, WTO acceding countries are required to submit a checklist on measures 
affecting trade in services
5. In practice, some developing countries encounter difficulties in 
compiling those measures (noteworthy in this regard is the case of Cambodia) and are only 
willing to open negotiations on specific commitments rather than being expected to provide 
a full response to the services checklist.
6 Some provisions in GATS, typically its Preamble, 
Articles IV and XIX, provide some flexibility for developing countries and LDCs in 
services negotiations. Moreover, the General Council’s Decision on LDC accession 
recognizes the special needs of LDCs and calls for additional flexibilities so as to facilitate 
their involvement in trade in services negotiations as well as services liberalization 
generally.  
 
As part of its current services negotiations, Lao PDR may be expected to adopt a 
similar approach, putting a focus on specific commitments for certain services, with some 
degree of flexibility being acknowledged by developed Members in the nature and extent of 
their services requests. At the same time, some WTO Members are likely to seek an 
equivalent level of WTO services commitments that Laos may have already agreed to 
pursuant to other regional and bilateral agreements. Generally, all countries that have joined 
the WTO have undertaken at least some commitments in business services (notably 
professional services such as accounting, legal, and architectural services), construction, 
and financial services. Most new Members have made commitments in some sub-sectors, 
such as distribution, environmental, tourism, and education services. A smaller share of 
Members has also made commitments in certain sub-sectors within 
                                                 
5 See WT/ACC/5. 
6 See footnote 19 of the World Bank, East Asia PREM, Building Export Competitiveness in Laos: 
Background Report 111, available at http://www.integratedframework.org/files/Lao_PDR_DTIS.pdf (last 
visited on 7 September 2007). 
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 communications—mostly telecom and courier services, but fewer in postal and audiovisual 
services. Social services, health, and recreational services sectors have experienced 
relatively fewer commitments. Developing countries have tended to phase-in certain of 
their commitments over time. Thus, Laos is likely to be pressed to open those sectors of its 
services market by reference to previous commitments. 
 
Of particular importance is Lao PDR’s previous commitments under the 
Agreement between the United States of America and the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic on Trade Relations (US-Lao PDR BTA) in 1997. In that agreement, in exchange 
for Normal Trade Relations (NTR) with the US, Lao PDR made much broader and deeper 
commitments to the US on trade in services, which was viewed as unusual. In its Chapter 
III on trade in services, with regard to market access, Laos promised not to impose any 
restrictions on the ability of nationals and companies of the US to engage in trade in 
services in the sectors listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 34, including some sectors of 
services which were rarely fully opened by LDCs, e.g., basic telecommunications services, 
audiovisual services, and health and medical care services. Lao PDR even promised it 
would not impose in those sectors Article 34 GATS limitations on the number of service 
suppliers, with some conditions, total value of service transactions or assets in certain forms, 
total number of service operations, natural persons that may be employed in those service 
sectors, and types of legal entity or joint ventures and participation of foreign capital. In 
addition, Lao promised to provide national treatment to US service and service suppliers 
unconditionally. Conversely, the US was only bound to implement existing specific 
commitments in its GATS services schedule. The above commitments by Laos in the 
US-Lao PDR BTA are beyond and, to some extent, inconsistent with the character of 
specific commitments found in GATS, as they place an unreasonable burden on Lao PDR. 
Although the US-Lao PDR BTA expired three years after its effective date, the US, EU and 
Australia still are tabling services requests with Lao PDR in their WTO negotiations based 
upon that agreement.   
TRIMs, SCM and Other FDI-related Aspects 
As for FDI policy, Laos’ investment regime has been widely criticized due to 
some inconsistencies with the WTO agreements, which reflects current external challenges 
from the WTO and its some of its Membership. 
Lao investment incentives have been particularly noted by some WTO Members. In this 
regard, the main body of Laos’ investment laws, namely, both the Law on the Promotion of 
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 Foreign Investment (2004) (LPFI) and the Law on the Promotion of Domestic Investment 




More specifically, LPDI Article 11 and Decree No.301/PM of the Prime 
Minister “Regarding the Implementation of the Law on the Promotion of Foreign 
Investment” Article 34 and Annex 2 provide for export subsidies and import substitution 
subsidies, and LPFI Article 18 provides for export subsidies. Both export subsidies and 
import substitution subsidies are prohibited by Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement (SCM). 
LPFI Article 18 entitles foreign investment enterprises involved in export production in 
promoted sectors to receive a range of duty and tax reductions and exemptions. LPDI 
Article 11 provides domestic investment enterprises involved in export production in 
promoted sectors and replacing imported goods certain duty and tax reductions and 
exemptions. In Decree No.301/PM, Article 34 and Annex 2 establish foreign investors’ 
eligibility for tax and duty exemptions or reductions which is tied to export percentages. In 
this regard, an enterprise exporting 80 percent or more of its output was eligible for the full 
range of incentives. In promoted sectors, in Annex 2, foreign companies are required to 
fulfill a minimum of three of six stipulated conditions, one of which was to use more than 
50 percent local raw material in production. Under the local content requirement, import 
duty remission or exemption is only granted for products or materials not available 
domestically.  
 
Although Lao PDR as an LDC is eligible for exemption from the prohibition of 
export subsidies according to SCM Article 27.2 (a) and Annex VII, the country is still 
subject to SCM Article 27.3, which provides eight years from the date of entry into force of 
the WTO Agreement as the grace period for entire elimination of import substitution 
subsidies. Moreover, Lao PDR has been invited to use the format of document 
G/SCM/6/Rev.1 to provide a subsidy notification according to SCM Article 25. Thus 
following some WTO Members’ demands, Lao PDR must take responsibility for 1) 
identification of clearly import substitution subsidies; (2) provision of an action plan to the 
WPAL with a date certain for the elimination of such subsidies; and (3) notification of all 
subsidies which include prohibited subsidies contingent upon export or the use of domestic 
over imported goods.
8
                                                 
7 See Law on the Promotion of Domestic Investment (2004), Article 9; Law on the Promotion of Foreign 
Investment (2004), Article 16. 
8 See Accession of the Lao PDR to the World Trade Organization: Factual Summary of Points Raised, 27, 
JOB (07)/160, (26 October 2007).   
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 Under the objectives set forth in the two investment laws of the National Assembly of Lao 
PDR, as specified above, Implementing Decree N.301/PM Article 34 and Annex 2 include 
the local content requirement, which could be construed as inconsistent with GATT 1994 
Article III on national treatment as well as TRIMs Article II:2. Such measures do not fall 
within the scope of Article 1 of the TRIMs Annex. However, Article 1 in the TRIMs Annex 
actually provides only an “illustrative”, not an “exhaustive” list of trade-related investment 
measures inconsistent with national treatment, thus Lao PDR still runs the risk that its local 
content requirement provisions in existing investment laws could be characterized as 
WTO-inconsistent. 
 
In its defense, Lao PDR has argued that certain flexibilities are granted to LDCs 
by the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference Declaration. Accordingly, transitional 
arrangements and transitional periods should be available to Lao PDR. But all new 
Members, such as Cambodia and Nepal, have agreed to eliminate such measures by the 
date of accession to the WTO, and this may lead to external pressure being exerted on Laos 
for immediate consistency with TRIMs upon its accession.   
 
Some other aspects concerning FDI are also criticized. The most controversial 
area concerns FDI-related labor laws. LPFI Article 12.5 requires foreign-invested 
companies to hire at least 90 percent of their work force locally. LPFI Article 13 obliges 
foreign investors to train, upgrade professional skills, and transfer technology to local 
employees. Laos’ Labor Law (2006) set up more general provisions on the employment of 
foreign workers. Article 7 of the Labor Law provides any labor unit may employ foreign 
workers “when necessary, if no appropriately qualified workers are available” in Lao PDR 
and the employment of foreign workers shall be limited in number and in duration, and “a 
detailed scheme shall be established for the transfer of skills to Lao workers to replace such 
foreign workers once the duration of their employment contract has been completed”. With 
certain exceptions, the introduction of foreign workers should be authorized by the Labour 
Administration prior to their entry into Lao PDR. Article 7 of the Labor Law further 
requires the Lao government not to authorize foreign workers to engage in certain activities 
“which are considered necessary to be reserved for Laos’ citizens” according to a specified 
list. Article 39 of the Labor Law does not provide equal protection of foreign workers’ 
remuneration when compared to that of domestic workers. All of the above provisions 
appear to be discriminatory against foreign workers, and the Lao PDR government does not 
appear to have justified such discriminatory measures by reference to any of the exceptions 
available in WTO agreements. 
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 Besides the above WTO legal shortcomings, a World Bank report
9 has also 
identified several problem areas which may be regarded as related to internal challenges or 
constraints faced by Laos as part of the WTO accession process. These problems include 
capacity and institutional constraints, infrastructural costs of doing business in Laos and 
access and cost of key inputs for business. The issue of infrastructural costs is illustrated in 
the later analysis on freedom of transit in this report. 
 
Capacity constraints in Laos are particularly evident in the inconsistencies which 
exist between central and local authorities, as has been identified and discussed in the above 
analysis of institutional arrangements. Institutional constraints also exist because of Laos’ 
lack of institutional capacity to effectively enforce its own laws, including its investment 
regime legislation. In the following table, the 2008 Doing Business study illustrates the 
ineffective enforcement of contracts in Lao PDR as one example of the adverse effects 
brought about by such institutional constraints. 
  
Table II: Enforcing Contracts (2006-2007) 
Indicator  Lao PDR  Region  OECD 
Procedures (number)  42  37.3  31.3 
Duration (days)  443  549.8  443.3 
Cost (% of claim)  31.6  47.8  17.7 
Source: World Bank, Doing Business 2008, available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=107 (last visited on 13 November 2007). 
Note: The ease or difficulty of enforcing commercial contracts is measured below. This is determined by 
following the evolution of a payment dispute and tracking the time, cost, and number of procedures involved 
from the moment a plaintiff files the lawsuit until actual payment.  
As another example, it would appear unreasonable that most companies in Laos are 
still paying a 35% profit tax, while the Lao government announced some time ago a 
reduction in the profit tax rate. Such institutional constraints further contribute to the 
corruption of officials in charge of law enforcement, which has been reported by private 
                                                 
9 See World Bank, East Asia PREM, Building Export Competitiveness in Laos: Background Report 114, 118, 
available at http://www.integratedframework.org/files/Lao_PDR_DTIS.pdf (last visited on 7 September 
2007). 
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 investors in Laos.
10
 
Financing and labor are two key inputs for FDI. Business access to formal debt 
and capital financing and financial services is very limited in Laos due to its 
underdeveloped financial services sector. At the same time, thinly capitalized domestic 
financial service providers face the prospect of significantly increased foreign competition 
due to potential market access commitments in the financial services sectors by Laos in 
connection with its WTO accession. The underdeveloped banking system in Lao PDR
11 
leads to comparatively weak credit system available for investors as opposed to averaged 
countries in the region, let alone as amongst OECD countries. See Table III. It is also 
noteworthy that Lao PDR currently has no equity/capital markets. 
Table III: Getting Credit (2006-2007) 
Indicator  Lao PDR  Region  OECD 
Legal Rights Index  2  4.5  6.4 
Credit Information Index  0  1.9  4.8 
Public registry coverage (% adults)  0.0  5.5  8.6 
Private bureau coverage (% adults)  0.0  10.8  59.3 
Source: World Bank, Doing Business 2008, available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=107 (last visited on 13 November 2007). 
Note: Measures on credit information sharing and the legal rights of borrowers and lenders are shown below. 
The Legal Rights Index ranges from 0-10, with higher scores indicating that those laws are better designed to 
expand access to credit. The Credit Information Index measures the scope, access and quality of credit 
information available through public registries or private bureaus. It ranges from 0-6, with higher values 
indicating that more credit information is available from a public registry or private bureau.   
Turning to labour conditions in Lao PDR, employees’ rights are satisfactorily 
protected under current labor policy and laws; however, employers complain that less 
flexibility for employers creates some rigidity in the labor market, especially as regards 
                                                 
10 See World Bank, East Asia PREM, Building Export Competitiveness in Laos: Background Report 101, 
available at http://www.integratedframework.org/files/Lao_PDR_DTIS.pdf (last visited on 7 September 
2007). 
11 The credit provided to the economy is less than 15% of GDP compared with an average for the ASEAN 
countries that exceeds 100 percent. Eighty percent of the SMEs do not take out loans. Footnote 25 in World 
Bank, East Asia PREM, Building Export Competitiveness in Laos: Background Report 117, available at 
http://www.integratedframework.org/files/Lao_PDR_DTIS.pdf (last visited on 7 September 2007). 
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 working hours and termination of employment contracts by employers, as Table IV 
demonstrates. 
 
Table IV: Employing Workers (2006-2007) 
Indicator  Lao PDR  Region  OECD 
Difficulty of Hiring Index  11  19.2  25.2 
Rigidity of Hours Index  40  20.8  39.2 
Difficulty of Firing Index  60  19.2  27.9 
Rigidity of Employment Index  37  19.7  30.8 
Non-wage labor cost (% of salary)  5  9.4  20.7 
Firing costs (weeks of wages)  19  37.8  25.7 
Source: World Bank, Doing Business 2008, available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=107 (last visited on 13 November 2007). 
Note: The difficulties that employers face in hiring and firing workers are shown below. Each index assigns 
values between 0 and 100, with higher values representing more rigid regulations. The Rigidity of 
Employment Index is an average of the three indices.  
Freedom of Transit and Related Issues 
As a landlocked country, Lao PDR serves as a transit country for its neighbors, all 
of which have become WTO Members. Lao PDR also has to utilize the logistics of its 
neighboring countries (especially Thailand and Vietnam) to transport goods to sea ports. 
Correspondingly, GATT 1994 Article V on freedom of transit requires transit Members to 
recognize and protect the other Members’ freedom of transit and provides for MFN on 
trade in goods through traffic in transit. Furthermore, transit Members shall not be subject 
to any unnecessary delays or restrictions and shall be exempted from any duties and 
charges relating to transit. Thus, after WTO accession, as a concomitant of the guarantee of 
freedom of transit afforded to neighboring countries, Lao PDR must institute measures to 
protect its neighboring countries’ freedom of transit. 
 
Freedom of transit should be protected along with the facilitation of cross-border 
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 procedures because both domestic transit and cross-border transportation are inalienable 
sections in the whole process of traffic in transit. The reduction of fee and simplification of 
formalities concerning importation and exportation are typically necessary for Lao PDR, as 
a landlocked country. Table V illustrates Laos’ current disadvantages in the efficiency of 
trading across borders.     
 
Table V: Trading Across Borders (2006-2007) 
Indicator  Lao PDR  Region  OECD 
Documents for export (number)  9  6.9  4.5 
Time for export (days)  50  24.5  9.8 
Cost to export (US$ per container)  1,750  885.3  905.0 
Documents for import (number)  10  7.5  5.0 
Time for import (days)  50  25.8  10.4 
Cost to import (US$ per container)  1,930  1,014.5  986.1 
Source: World Bank, Doing Business 2008, available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=107 (last visited on 13 November 2007). 
Note: The costs and procedures involved in importing and exporting a standardized shipment of goods are 
detailed under this topic. Every official procedure involved is recorded - starting from the final contractual 
agreement between the two parties, and ending with the delivery of the goods.  
 
Other relevant WTO provisions associated with freedom of transit, and falling 
under the rubric of trade facilitation generally, are GATT 1994 Articles VIII and X. In 
particular, GATT 1994 Article X requires that freedom of transit should be protected by the 
publication and administration of relevant trade regulations. 
 
Annex D of “July Package”, subsequent negotiations of the NGTF and Annex E 
of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, which address further development and 
refinement of GATT 1994 Articles V, VIII and X, have not been viewed negatively by the 
developing countries or by LDCs. On account of the substantial progress made in these 
WTO trade facilitation negotiations, Lao PDR faces challenges that its interests may not 
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 have been fully protected as a landlocked country, although its has nonetheless participated 
to some extent in these WTO negotiations. TA and support for CB have been reaffirmed in 
the NGTF deliberations but methods of enforcement have not been specified, for example, 
with respect to implementation of ICT and automation measures by LDCs. Moreover, the 
important documents in the NGTF negotiations
12 do not include the implementation costs 
of the identified measures for developing countries and LDCs as well as prioritization and 
sequencing concerns. These issues have been raised but not specified in detail in Annex E 
of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. In addition, in the NGTF negotiations, some 
developing and LDC countries have advanced the notion that new WTO commitments on 
the part of developing countries should not be subject to DSB action and should not lead to 
possible non-compliance penalization.
13 However, such suggestions have not been included 
in Annex E of Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration.  These developments may place 
additional, future external constraints on Lao PDR once it accedes to the WTO.   
 
On the other hand, there are also good signs. For instance, Annex E of the Hong 
Kong Ministerial Declaration includes Article V GATT 1994 improvements. As a 
landlocked country, Lao PDR generally favors multilateral liberalization with respect to 
transit reforms.   
Other Challenges Outlined 
Besides the aforesaid issues, there are also other important WTO issues bearing 
on the Lao PDR accession. WTO rules on customs valuation pose a challenge to Laos’ 
decentralized customs and government administration. WTO TBT and SPS Agreements 
require Lao PDR to set up an effective standards regime and organization to notify relevant 
information and respond to inquiries from other WTO Members. Laos’ intellectual property 
law is still in an early stage of development, and is also likely to be subject to scrutiny by 
WTO Members as per TRIPs.
14 All of these examples constitute external challenges to 
Laos during the accession process.   
 
Lao PDR also faces other internal challenges as well. One such challenge is the 
general lack of legal consciousness in Lao society. This lack of legal consciousness 
                                                 
12 See TN//W/43/Rev.1 and TN//W/43/Rev.2.   
13 See Donald Lewis, Trade Facilitation: Issues and Negotiations 10 (2005). 
14 See World Bank, East Asia PREM, Building Export Competitiveness in Laos: Background Report 39, 44, 
available at http://www.integratedframework.org/files/Lao_PDR_DTIS.pdf (last visited on 7 September 
2007). 
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 underlies Lao PDR’s weak legal protection and enforcement. In the short term, this reduces 
the credibility of the actual implementation of WTO commitments by Lao PDR. In the 
longer term, Lao socio-economic development is likely to be hampered due to such legal 
deficiencies.  
    
II. Domestic Reform Process and WTO Accession: Linkages 
 
Confronted with external and internal challenges as illustrated above, Lao PDR 
has undertaken domestic reforms to link its domestic policies and laws to proposed WTO 
commitments. 
 
Lao PDR has vigorously demarcated its roadmap for such linkages. To try to 
ensure that the benefits of domestic reforms flow through to the poorest members of Lao 
society, the government has adopted a NGPES in 2003. The Committee for Planning and 
Investment is responsible for coordinating the preparation and implementation of the 
NGPES, and, also, the NSEDP. The last NSEDP finished at the end of 2005, and the sixth 
plan for the period 2006–2010 has been adopted by the National Assembly. Meanwhile, the 
National Export Strategy has also been enacted in late 2005. The NGPES refers to trade 
policy and lists tariff reductions scheduled under AFTA as part of the government’s 
package of policies for eradicating mass poverty. It also sets Laos’ aim to graduate from 
LDC status by 2020. The sixth NSEDP (2006-2010) reaffirmed Laos’ objective to fully 
implement this integration roadmap and related commitments “to become a prestigious 
member of international organizations (including WTO) and in multilateral relationships 
such as AFTA and GMS”.
15  
 
In 2006-2007, the National Assembly considered and adopted the socio-economic 
development plan, state budgetary plan, rural development and poverty reduction 
programme of the Government. It considered the work of the People’s Supreme Court and 
Supreme Public Prosecutor, adopted three new laws,
16 amendments to four laws
17 and 
determined a plan for overseeing the rural development and poverty reduction programme.   
                                                 
15 Lao PDR: Sixth National Socio-economic Development Plan (2006-2010), Part I Chapter IV Section F: 5. 
16 Those are Law on Commercial Banks, Law on Protection of Children’s Right and Interests and Law on 
Value-added Tax. 
17 Those are amendments to Law on National Assembly, Law on State Budget, Law on Labor and Law on 
Court Fees. 
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In 2007-2008, the National Assembly will concentrate on translating policies and decrees of 
the Party into laws to further international integration and linkages. It will make efforts in 
formulating seven new laws: Law on Intellectual Property, Law on Standardization and 
Measurements, Drug Law, Sports Law, Law on Fire Prevention and Extinguishment, Law on 
Protecting Plants and Law on Auctions. Amendments will be made to some laws, including 
the Law on Foreign Investment, Law on Local Governance, and the Tax Law. Moreover, 
three newly drafted laws will be considered for adoption, namely, the Law on the People’s 
Security Forces, Law on State Audits and Law on State Inspection. 
 
In the following sections, three aspects of the Lao PDR reform process will be 
emphasized: institutional arrangements, FDI policies, and the role of “landlockedness”. The 
lessons and “good practices” of Nepal, a landlocked LDC similar to Laos, recently acceded 
to the WTO, will also be considered for possible reference by Laos. 
Institutional Arrangements 
Progress in Lao PDR still needs to be made as regards the publication of trade 
regulations pertaining to GATT Article X and GATS Article III. However, as for other 
aspects of administrative transparency, especially regarding management and expenditures 
of the state budget, some laws have been or are in the process of being formulated, 
including Law on Oversight of the National Assembly, Law on Anti-corruption, Law on 
State Budget, and the Law on State Inspection. Such laws aim to help activities of 
organizations and individuals in the administrative sector to be transparent, improve the 
state management mechanism, and, further, to eliminate social ills, especially corruption as 
well as violations of the law. 
 
According to GATT 1994 Article X:3(a), all trade regulations should be 
administered in a uniform manner. The uniformity requires two levels of coordination: 
coordination between line agencies on the horizontal level, and coordination between 
central government and local governments on the vertical level. In the following discussion, 
general institutional arrangements and related laws will be mentioned by reference to the 
Lao customs system.   
 
Horizontal coordination has been enhanced mainly through a National Steering 
Committee or NSC created by the Lao government. The NSC is chaired by the Deputy 
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 Prime Minister, who is also the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the Minister of Industry 
and Commerce as deputy chairman. The NSC mandate is to directly lead the preparatory 
work for accession to WTO. The 19 members of the committee, who are mainly ministers, 
comprise the government agencies affected by accession. The Vice-Minister of Industry and 
Commerce was appointed as the lead negotiator for the accession process. He has the 
operational responsibility for the negotiations over WTO accession. The Director-General 
of the Foreign Trade Department was appointed as deputy to the Vice-Minister with 
responsibility for policy development and coordination among agencies through an 
inter-agency accession committee. A small unit has been established within the department 
to deal with foreign trade policy matters including WTO work. The head of the unit reports 
directly to the Vice-Minister of Industry and Commerce.
18 Specifically, in customs, it has 
been a long-existing problem that border regulation is not well-coordinated. Imported and 
exported products should undergo inspection by several government agencies, such as 
MOIC, Customs, etc. These problems could be partly eased through the implementation of 
an automated Customs database system (c-2000). That system was developed locally with 
TA under UNDP project 96/005.
19 Its creation facilitates customs transaction data gathering 
and statistics, which allows other agencies easier and quicker access to customs data 
without the need for their own independent inspections.   
 
On the vertical level, Laos’ constitution, following Leninism, has affirmed that the 
principle of democratic centralism should be applied to the relationship between central and 
local governments. In other words, local government should be led by the central 
government while retaining its own power to decide some local affairs. The Law on 
Government, the Law on Local Administration, which were enacted in 2003 during the 
domestic reform process, have also recognized that unified and systematic local 
administration throughout the country is necessary to ensure the effective implementation 
of the laws and socio-economic development plans.
20 These legal developments should 
result in trade regulations being administered in a uniform manner. In Laos’ customs system, 
the responsibility for administration of the customs houses and checkpoints in the 18 
provinces has been largely delegated to the provincial governments by the central 
government of Laos. Thus, the Laos’ Customs Department does not exercise full 
                                                 
18 See United Nations, The Doha Development Agenda: Perspectives from the ESCAP Region 239, 240, 
available at http://www.unescap.org/tid/publication/t&ipub2278.asp (last visited 10 September 2007). 
19 See World Bank, East Asia PREM, Building Export Competitiveness in Laos: Background Report 79 and 
81, available at http://www.integratedframework.org/files/Lao_PDR_DTIS.pdf (last visited on 7 September 
2007). 
20 See Article 1 of the Law on Local Administration. 
  23 
 managerial control over field operations across the country. Confronted with a situation 
which is inconsistent with WTO rules, the Customs Department has prepared an 
organizational strategy to introduce a national administration. The first stage is the 
strengthening of the Department’s monitoring and control of Customs offices through a 
program of field monitoring visits by teams led by senior departmental managers.
21 The 
second stage entails implementation of a new departmental organization structure in order 
to increase the capacity of the Department to exercise direct managerial control of field 
operations and to carry out essential headquarters policy and program management 
functions. 
 
Also, Lao PDR takes step to improve its administrative impartiality and 
objectivity as per Article X:3 GATT 1994. Although having no administrative litigation 
procedure, the Law on Civil Procedure, newly amended in 2004, has already authorized the 
civil chamber of the Lao courts to apply civil proceedings to cases relating to administrative 
relationships, including “the acts of administrative officials in connection with the 
imposition of penalties,…the improper seizure of assets [and] other mistakes [made by 
administrative officials]”
 22. That law provides for the proceedings as to re-opening of such 
cases.
23 With regard to current provisions in that law, it could be assessed that Lao PDR is 
now in substantial compliance with the requirements of Article X:3(a) and (b), although the 
time periods for such trials seem to require further definition in order to meet the 
requirement of “prompt” review and correction as set forth in Article X:3(b).   
 
Moreover, other laws
24 in Lao PDR have established diverse channels to 
control the administration of law, such as people’s complaints and petitions to the National 
Assembly and government, oversight of the National Assembly, state audits, state 
inspections, anti-corruption measures, state budget controls, etc. Typically, in new Customs 
Law, which entered into force on 25 May 2005, rights as to administrative review have 
been provided to any owner of goods “who does not agree with the amount of customs 
duties, other obligations and fines paid” towards “the Customs Authority as to request for 
                                                 
21 Those teams have the authority to provide direction to local staff on proper procedures and to ensure 
corrective action is taken. The teams are required to provide a written report of their visits to the Director 
General. See the details of the reform in World Bank, East Asia PREM, Building Export Competitiveness in 
Laos: Background Report 82, available at http://www.integratedframework.org/files/Lao_PDR_DTIS.pdf (last 
visited on 7 September 2007). 
22 Law on Civil Procedure, Article 47. 
23 See Law on Civil Procedure, Part VIII. 
24 Such law include but is not limited into the Law on Oversight of the National Assembly, Law on 
Anti-corruption, Law on State Budget, Law on State Inspection 
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 the review of documents or reconsider the case in accordance with the laws and 
regulations”.
  25 Customs Law 2005 Article 29 even stipulates detailed procedures for 
administrative appeals and judicial review as to customs declarations. It provides that the 
customs declarant has the right to file a written appeal with the Customs Authority under 
specific conditions and time limits; the Custom Authority must consider and provide an 
answer to the appeal within a definite period and must provide explanations, reasons and 
make recommendations as necessary; the customs declarant has the right to appeal to the 
next higher authority and, alternatively, file a claim in court. Although still not clarified, 
such court claims might be understood as providing test cases for administrative litigation.   
FDI Policies   
With the rising perception of the importance of FDI in economic development 
and reform, FDI in Lao PDR has shown substantial growth in recent years. In 2005, actual 
investment increased one third with regard to 2004, from near US$ 300 million to US$ 400 
million. In 2006, the gross FDI in Lao PDR was estimated at more than US$500m.
26  
 
FDI policy reform and perception enhancement are the primary underlying 
reasons for the foreign capital surge into Lao PDR. In Laos, as the central element for 
policy reform in the context of development of a market economy as a rule-based economy, 
a fairly developed legal regime has been created with a view to achieving WTO-consistency. 
Until now, such a legal regime has concentrated on investment laws which directly regulate 
FDI, such as the Law on the Promotion of Foreign Investment (2004) (LPFI) (replacing the 
Law on the Promotion and Management of Foreign Investment of 1994) and its 
Implementing Decree No. 300/PM, Law on the Promotion of Domestic Investment 
(amended in 2004) (LPDI) and its Implementing Decree No. 301/PM. Also, there are 
relevant laws concerning business activities which are supportive of the FDI legal regime: 
Insurance Law (1990), Law on Civil Procedure (Amended in 2004), Decree No. 15/PM on 
Trade Competition (2004), Enterprise Law (2005) (replacing Business Law (1994)), 
Customs Law (2005), Tax Law (2005), Labor Law (2006), Law on Value Added Tax (VAT) 
(2006), and Law on Commercial Banks (2006). 
 
                                                 
25 See Customs Law 2005, Article 66. The Customs Authority basically means the responsible customs agency, 
who implements the legal power or collect duties or fines. See Customs Law, Article 4.   
26 See World Bank Vientiane Office, Lao PDR Economic Monitor 20, available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAOPRD/Resources/293582-1096519010070/2006nov_lao_economic
_monitor.pdf (last visited on 12 September 2007). 
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 According to a report by the Deputy Permanent Secretary of MOIC for UNESCAP 
ARTNeT in July 2007, the following list endeavors to stress Laos’ core policies and legal 
reforms as regards FDI in recent years: 
z  Single Stop Service 
z  Making business start-up easier 
z  Private sector development 
z  Decentralization 
z  Investment facilitation and promotion
27 
 
In fact, all of these measures intend to facilitate and promote investment, 
including FDI. The first two items in the list, which are more WTO-relevant, are 
particularly emphasized as follows. 
 
The Committee for Promotion and Management of Investment (CPMI) served 
as a “one-stop-service” for investment approval. Pursuant to LPFI Article 19, the CPMI 
examines the investment applications and supporting documents in coordination with the 
relevant sectoral and local authorities, who could comment on the projects. Article 20 
provides qualified foreign investors should obtain a foreign investment license, an 
enterprise certificate and a tax registration certificate at the same time from the CPMI at the 
place where the foreign investment are licensed. On the contrary, domestic investors still 
need to file an application to a trade authority plus CPMI. Qualified domestic investors 
submitting an application to a trade authority shall obtain an enterprise registration 
certificate and tax registration certificate at the trade authority where applications are 
submitted in addition to the same documents as the ones received by foreign investors from 
CPMI.
28 And the time for the granting of licenses has no serious difference between 
domestic investment and foreign investment.
29  
 
Newly adopted investment-related laws also relax the requirement and simplify 
and shorten the procedure on the start-up of foreign investment enterprises. Pursuant to the 
LPFI in 2004, within the limitation of the screening approach for foreign investment 
applications, there is more rapid response in terms of the number of days to respond to 
                                                 
27 Sirisamphanh Vorachith, Country Note on Trade and Investment Policy Coordination: Country: Lao PDR 
for ARTNeT Consultative Meeting on Trade and Investment Policy Coordination 16-17 July 2007, Bangkok, 
Thailand, available at http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/mtg/tipc_laonotes.pdf (last visited on 16 November 
2007). 
28 See LPDI Articles 12 and 13. 
29 See LPFI Article 20 and LPDI Article 13. 
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 applications.
30 The Enterprise Law, based upon original Business Law, reduces the amount 
of documentation required and does away with stringent conditions such as minimum 
capital requirements, and thus decreases the ambiguities of procedures and shortens the 
timeframe of business registration approval.
31 Moreover, the Enterprise Law replaces the 
positive list approach with a negative list approach for issuing registrations for business 
entities. Only within a few controlled sectors are sectoral or business approvals/licenses 
required.  
 
All of above illustrated measures provide foreign investment with more equal or 
even superior treatment compared with domestic investment, as is consistent with the basic 
principle of the WTO on non-discrimination. Such consistency is especially important to 
trade in services. Because internal regulations may constitute a major obstacle for free trade 
in services, GATS Article XVII specifically refers to national treatment for foreign services 
and service suppliers contingent upon Members’ specific commitments. The above 
measures do not appear to be inconsistent with Article XVII. Moreover, besides those 
provisions considered in Part I of this report, other investment measures are in general 
consistent with TRIMs. 
  
Furthermore, Laos’ government has implemented a series of reforms to develop 
supportive legal regimes to facilitate FDI into the country in order to improve the 
investment climate. On the institutional level, as for publication under GATT 1994 Articles 
X:1 and 2, the Lao government has set up websites and an official quarterly newsletter to 
disseminate FDI information to investors and to promote foreign investment. As for policy 
coordination under GATT 1994 Article X:3(a), NLPC has been established as the 
coordinative organization for line ministries and agencies involved in land administration 
and management and reorganized DONLUPAD as the secretariat of NLPC; also, provinces 
have been granted more autonomy on approval of FDI and the roles and responsibilities of 
responsible authorities at the central and local levels have been clarified.
32  
Another major area of domestic reform is tax law. First, pursuant to 2005 Tax 
                                                 
30 See LPFI Article 20. 
31 See World Bank, East Asia PREM, Building Export Competitiveness in Laos: Background Report 104, 105, 
available at http://www.integratedframework.org/files/Lao_PDR_DTIS.pdf (last visited on 7 September 
2007). 
32 See details in those measures in Policies and Good Practices in Investment Promotion and Facilitation in 
United Nations ESCAP, Least Developed Countries: Bhutan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and 
Timor-leste 17, 19 (Thailand, UNESCAP publication, 2005). 
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 Law Article 28, whether imported or domestically produced, the listed goods and services 
are subject to excise tax equally, as is typically consistent with GATT 1994 Article III and 
also the more flexible GATS Article XVII which is contingent upon specific commitments. 
Previously, the excise duty regime based on Notification No.1061/MOF of 13 June 2003 
had imposed substantially higher duties on imports than on domestic production. Second, 
according to 2005 Tax Law Articles 11 and 12, importation of goods from abroad and 
services are also subject to business turnover tax. In that law, Article 13 further provides for 
exemption from business turnover tax, which includes the importation of 10 categories of 
goods, such as plants and animals, materials for research and scientific analysis, which are 
also consistent with GATT 1994 Article III.   
On the other hand, in 2005 Tax Law, problems still exist. Article 14 set the taxable 
basis for turnover tax on imported goods as including import duty and excise tax, if 
applicable, while domestically-produced goods circulated within Lao PDR are taxed on the 
basis of actual value of the sales contract, actual sales price, and total services income for 
services providers, etc. Thus, it appears that imported goods have a more burdensome 
taxable basis, which includes import duty and excise tax, compared with 
domestically-produced goods. More obviously, Article 17 sets a table of rates of business 
turnover tax which differentiate domestic production from importation and sale of goods. 
As per that table, as for most listed goods, domestic production bears 5%-10% less business 
turnover tax burden than importation. As an example, Article 13, Section 24 expressly 
states that domestic manufacture of bio fertilizer is exempted from business turnover tax 
while imported bio fertilizer is subject to that tax with a tax rate of 5%. 
As an updated document of Laos’ accession
33 discloses, Lao PDR intended to 
replace the turnover tax with value added tax (VAT) by January 2009. A single rate of 10 
percent was being contemplated; with exports zero-rated. The National Assembly had 
adopted the VAT Law in December 2006 and the Ministry of Finance was currently 
drafting regulations to implement the Law. As a single rate is planned to be applied, 
inconsistency of 2005 Tax Law Article 17 with GATT 1994 Article III is expected to be 
solved by the application of the VAT system. However, VAT would initially be applied to 
only businesses with annual turnover exceeding KN 400 million; thus enterprises not 
required to comply with the new VAT system would continue to pay turnover tax pursuant 
to the 2005 Tax Law. Such a separate application of 2005 Tax Law and VAT Law will 
weaken the effect of the improvement in VAT Law.     
                                                 
33 See Accession of the Lao PDR to the World Trade Organization: Factual Summary of Pointes Raised, 19, 
20, JOB (07)/160, (26 October 2007). 
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 Relevant financial laws facilitate not only funding inputs for standard FDI, but 
also particular FDI in financial sectors. Take 1990 Insurance Law and 2006 Law on 
Commercial Banks as examples. 1990 Insurance Law provides insurance enterprises in the 
form of only partnership or branched of foreign insurance companies have the right to 
conduct insurance business in Lao PDR.
34 That provision seems especially in favor of 
foreign investment in insurance in Lao PDR. Moreover, that insurance law intends to 
establish a modernized insurance system to facilitate the introduction of FDI. On the other 
hand, it could be said that the form of foreign investment in Laos’ insurance sector is 
restricted to branches of foreign insurance companies. Also, the scope of business 
conducted by insurance enterprises is strictly limited.
35 Those provisions reserve national 
treatment and market access in trade of insurance services. It is still unclear whether they 
could be fully written into the Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services attached to 
proposed Protocol on the Accession of Lao PDR. The 2006 Law on Commercial Banks 
seems more advanced than the 1990 Insurance Law. It permits all forms of companies set 
forth in the Enterprise Law (except the sole limited company) for the establishment of 
banks.
36 Also, the Commercial Banks Law emphasizes equality in business operations and 
state policies concerning promotion and encouragement of both domestic and foreign 
investment in banking business.
37 On the other hand, there are only a few unequal 
restrictions on foreign investment, such as ones on minimum investment capital.
38 So, in 
general, the 2006 Law on Commercial Banks approaches compliance with GATS 
requirements on market access and national treatment. Also, the Commercial Banks Law 
stipulates in detail rules ranging from banking operations to insolvency, as well as rules on 
banking supervision and inspection, and thereby contributes significantly to the 
improvement of the financial environment for FDI in Lao PDR.   
In addition, Lao PDR has made other efforts to improve domestic FDI-related 
policies and laws in order to achieve WTO-consistency. For instance, on 4 February 2004, 
the Lao government adopted Decree No.15/PM “On Trade Competition”, which provides 
the basic legal framework for the promotion of fair competition, including competition 
between foreign investment and domestic investment.   
 
                                                 
34 See Insurance Law (1990) Articles 4 and 5. 
35 See Insurance Law (1990) Articles 4 and 5. 
36 See Law on Commercial Banks (2006) Article 17. 
37 See Law on Commercial Banks (2006) Articles 4 & 6. 
38 See Law on Commercial Banks (2006) Article 13. 
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Role of “Landlockedness”   
Lao PDR, as a landlocked country, bears certain special characteristics which 
affect the process of domestic reform and international economic integration. As evaluated 
by the World Bank, “landlockedness” primarily presents three dimensions of difficulty for 
the Lao domestic economy: (1) physical isolation from foreign markets; (2) efficiency of 
logistics services; and (3) availability of infrastructure and border crossings.
39 The first 
dimension is not a significant problem thanks to the short distance between Lao cities and 
gateway ports in Thailand and Vietnam. The second dimension mainly reflects the linkage 
between landlockedness and GATT 1994 Article V, GATS, whilst the third dimension 
primarily relates to GATT 1994 Article VIII.   
 
In 2004, the Lao-Thai Transit Agreement was finally ratified, having been first   
proposed in 1999. The agreement is generally consistent with GATT 1994 Article V 
although in practice national treatment is not always applied to goods in transit, particular 
as regards choice of modes of transport. Moreover, that bilateral agreement grants the right 
to transit to both of the two countries’ trucking companies, private and public, by road or 
international port. Also, the agreement provides for mutual recognition of trucking 
companies’ licenses while requiring that transporters comply with national laws and 
regulations while transiting that country. Such provisions actually lay down the openness of 
Laos’ market in road transportation services, which might be served as reference in bilateral 
negotiations on the Lao WTO accession. Finally, the agreement calls for facilitation of 
cross-border movements and avoidance of unnecessary customs inspection subject to 
provision of proper transport documents, which essentially reduces the fees and times for 
cross-border importation and exportation. Accordingly, the Lao-Thai Transit Agreement is 
compatible with GATT 1994 Article VIII. Similarly, Lao has signed a bilateral agreement 
with Vietnam. The meetings between transport officials of the Government of Lao PDR 
and the Governments of Thailand and Vietnam are held at least twice a year to review the 
implementation of their respective agreements. Besides bilateral discussions, Lao PDR has 
joined a series of regional arrangements in ASEAN and GMS
40, which aim at further 
                                                 
39 See World Bank, East Asia PREM, Building Export Competitiveness in Laos: Background Report 51, 
available at http://www.integratedframework.org/files/Lao_PDR_DTIS.pdf (last visited on 7 September 
2007). 
40 Those regional agreements include but are not limited to: under ASEAN, the Framework Agreement on 
Mutual Recognition Arrangements, the Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit, the 
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 simplification and unification of regulations on cross-border and inter-state transportation.   
 
Also, in domestic law, Lao PDR actively implements international, regional, 
bilateral agreements. Typically, Article 33 of Customs Law (2005) promises goods in 
transit shall be subject to the suspension of customs duties on the condition of presentment 
of the “movement permit of goods in transit accompanied by security to the customs 
officers along its transport route and the border customs checkpoint at the point of export in 
order to manage the transit”.
41 Moreover, the Laos’ customs procedures for clearing 
imports and exports have already been significantly improved and simplified in recent years. 
The commodity classification has been converted to the Harmonized System. A single 
administrative document similar but not identical to the UN Layout Key format was 
introduced in 2000. This document is used for imports, exports, and transit goods, and 
replaced 16 documents. Direct clearance of goods at the factory is permitted in certain 
situations. The average time to clear cargo has been substantially reduced both in Laos and 
at the transit facilities in Klong Toey.
42  
Lessons and “Good Practices” from Nepal 
Nepal, similar to Lao PDR, as an LDC and landlocked country, successfully 
acceded to the WTO in 2003 – 14 years after its Working Party was established in 1989. 
Nepal’s lessons and “good practices” during its WTO accession may serve as a valuable 
reference for Lao PDR. 
 
Generally speaking, Nepal successfully utilized some available flexibility in the 
WTO rules for LDCs and developing countries during its accession, which may be 
evaluated as the most important aspect of the Nepal WTO accession for Laos. Such an 
approach may minimize the impact of WTO-mandated domestic reforms on the Lao 
national economy and general society. Having regard to the 2002 General Council Decision 
on accession of LDCs
43, paragraph 42 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration
44, the mandate 
                                                                                                                                                     
Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Inter-State Transport, the Framework Agreement on Multimodal 
Transport; under GMS, the Agreement for the Facilitation of the Cross-border Transport of Goods and People. 
See the details in United Nations ESCAP, Landlocked Developing Countries Series, No. 1: Transit Transport 
Issues in Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries 55, 56, available at 
http://www.unescap.org/publications/detail.asp?id=987 (last visited on 12 September 2007). 
41 Customs Law (2005), Article 33. 
42 See World Bank, East Asia PREM, Building Export Competitiveness in Laos: Background Report 66, 
available at http://www.integratedframework.org/files/Lao_PDR_DTIS.pdf (last visited on 7 September 
2007). 
43 WT/L/508. 
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 in paragraph 18(iii) of the WTO Work Program on LDCs
45, Nepal’s WTO accession was 
conducted in a more simplified manner. WT/ACC/10/Rev.3 provided Nepal, as an LDC, 
with longer transition periods. Moreover, thanks to the 1979 Enabling Clause as well as 
paragraph 42 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, Nepal enjoys the other WTO Members’ 
proposed commitments on duty-free, quota-free market access for its products.   
 
On the other hand, Nepal also faced difficulties in availing itself of the benefits of 
S&D treatment provisions during the accession negotiation process. WTO trading partners 
were rigorous demandeurs. They raised harsh requests concerning Nepal’s commitments, 
including a range of WTO-plus issues, such as the ITA, chemical harmonization, textile 
harmonization and government procurement. This slowed Nepal’s WTO accession, which 
offset the WTO aim of expediting LDC accession procedure.
46 Nepal chose to delay 
accession, rather than enter into commitments on such unfavorable new issues and 
plurilateral agreements. Thus, Nepal finally did not join the ITA. Nor did it sign any 
informal sectoral agreements. Therefore, Nepal was successful in rebuffing many of the 
requests of the most strident of the WTO demandeurs. However, Nepal has committed to 
enter into certain favorable negotiations, such as NGTF negotiations on Article V. 
 
As another generally positive aspect of its accession, the Nepal government 
co-opted private sector involvement through business interactions and institutional 
mechanisms in preparation for WTO accession, so that a feeling of national ownership 
concerning WTO accession was generated. Nonetheless, despite a number of measures to 
improve private participation, the dialogue between the private sector and government still 
lagged behind its neighboring countries.
47
 
Specifically, with regard to institutional arrangements, Nepal gave the highest 
priority to coordination among government ministries and departments by establishing a 
high-level committee to prepare for WTO accession. That committee, is chaired by the 
Secretary of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Supplies, and is comprised of the 
Secretaries or representatives of line agencies. The system apparently worked well during 
the accession. 
                                                                                                                                                     
44 WTO document: WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 
45 WTO document: WT/COMTD/LDC/11 
46 See United Nations, The Doha Development Agenda: Perspectives from the ESCAP Region 272, available 
at http://www.unescap.org/tid/publication/t&ipub2278.asp (last visited 10 September 2007). 
47 See United Nations, The Doha Development Agenda: Perspectives from the ESCAP Region 256, available 
at http://www.unescap.org/tid/publication/t&ipub2278.asp (last visited 10 September 2007). 
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As for tariff bindings, Nepal took the strategy of trading off low tariff rates and 
other benefits with trading partners. Its tariffs have been bound high for imports similar to 
products of established domestic industries, with lower bindings for products that are 
similar to potential industries and lower applied rates for non-potential industries. The 
impact of tariff reductions on government tax revenues has also been given the utmost 
importance while negotiating tariff bindings.
48 As a result, Nepal offered 60 percent in the 
maximum bound rate on manufactured products and the average bound rate is 24 percent, 
while the average applied rate (in 2002) was 14 percent.
49
Nepal did not bind its agricultural export subsidies at zero upon WTO accession 
owing to the S&D treatment on the binding of export subsidies for LDCs agreed upon in 
the Uruguay Round. Furthermore, because of the 2002 General Council Decision on 
accession of LDCs, Nepal made commitments in fewer services sectors than did most other 
new WTO Members. Nepal also negotiated transition periods of three years in the 
implementation of Customs Valuation Agreement, TBT Agreement and TRIPs, and four 
years for implementation of the SPS Agreement. As the precondition for acquiring those 
transition periods, Nepal submitted relevant plans of action to promise its step-by-step 
domestic integration, including the revision or stipulation of relevant policies, laws and 
procedures as well as enhancing their enforcement, and the establishment or reorganization 
of corresponding responsible institutions. However, immediately upon accession, Nepal 
reformed its domestic policy environment to abolish any measures inconsistent with TRIMs, 
national treatment, the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, and to meet the 
requirements in those WTO rules.
50  
III. Policy Recommendations 
 
In its bid to overcome the external and internal challenges identified above and 
integrate effectively into the global economy, Lao PDR should be mindful of the primary 
solution to such constraints as suggested by Priority 3 of the APA: active participation in 
                                                 
48 United Nations, The Doha Development Agenda: Perspectives from the ESCAP Region 257, available at 
http://www.unescap.org/tid/publication/t&ipub2278.asp (last visited 10 September 2007). 
49 See World Bank, East Asia PREM, Building Export Competitiveness in Laos: Background Report 37, 
available at http://www.integratedframework.org/files/Lao_PDR_DTIS.pdf (last visited on 13 September 
2007) 
50 See World Bank, East Asia PREM, Building Export Competitiveness in Laos: Background Report 37, 44, 
available at http://www.integratedframework.org/files/Lao_PDR_DTIS.pdf (last visited on 13 September 
2007) 
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 “international conventions and regional, subregional and bilateral agreements”.
51 In other 
words, multilateral, regional and bilateral trade liberalization are the surest ways forward. 
Full and effective implementation of such forms of liberalization requires a strong political 
commitment at the national level, which underlines the linkage of coherent national 
domestic reform strategies with the process of global integration. 
Domestic Aspects 
The Lao government itself should adopt measures to improve its trade and 
domestic policies with a view to achieving WTO-consistency. In terms of institutional 
arrangements, the Lao government should promptly publish all of its important 
trade-related policies, laws and other measures of general application – ideally, through an 
official publication and/or over the official government website. Moreover, Lao PDR 
should further strengthen the unification and coordination of its trade administrative 
system – amongst line agencies as well as between central and local government 
departments, especially as regards customs and accession negotiations. Finally, 
WTO-consistent remedies to contest trade-related administrative decisions should be 
established. As Laos’ administrative complaint procedures appear at present to be arguably 
WTO-consistent, further steps should be taken to provide avenues for impartial, objective 
and comprehensive administrative appeals, and/or administrative litigation procedures.   
 
As regards tariff bindings and the elimination of NTBs, Lao PDR necessarily 
needs to negotiate import tariff reductions and non-tariff restrictions with its main WTO 
trading partners. Specifically, in the area of trade in agricultural products, tariff-rate quotas 
should replace WTO-inconsistent NTBs; import business registration and the Indicative 
Plan have to be comprehensively examined, improved or replaced by appropriate measures 
to achieve consistency with the WTO agreements. In the services trade, the Lao 
government should actively communicate and negotiate bilaterally to meet the requirements 
of the WTO rules on market access and national treatment according to levels of recently 
acceding countries at similar development stages.   
 
With respect to FDI-related issues, Lao PDR investment laws, such as LPFI, LPDI 
and their Implementing Decrees, should be amended to be consistent with TRIMs as well 
as the SCM Agreement. Especially, local content requirements should be gradually 
eliminated as per the requirements of the WTO agreements. As for other relevant economic 
                                                 
51 A/CONF.202/3, Annex 1, Article 35. 
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 laws, discriminatory provisions in the Labor Law and 2005 Tax Law should be abolished in 
order to comply with WTO principles and rules on national treatment and market access; 
whilst the Enterprise Law, Decree on Trade Competition, VAT Law, Customs Law, Law 
on Commercial Banks, and 2004 Law on Civil Procedure, should be further rectified or 
improved by more detailed regulations. The Insurance Law should be redrafted: it is 
out-dated and its WTO-inconsistent provisions should be repealed. As for FDI-related 
policies, internal constraints should be remedied: whether related to capacity and/or 
institutional building or to the improvement of infrastructure, financial supporting systems 
or a more progressive labor market regime. As regards trade facilitation, the Lao 
government should focus further attention on the implementation of relevant bilateral and 
multilateral agreements. Implementing regulations to the Customs Law should be 
introduced as soon as possible, especially with respect to rules of origin, pre-shipment 
inspection and customs valuation, in order to comply with relevant WTO and regional 
agreements.   
 
On the other hand, during and after WTO accession, Lao PDR may actively 
resort to all the available opportunities and favorable regional and multilateral rules which 
are WTO-inclusive or WTO-consistent. Learning from the lessons and “good practices” of 
newly acceding LDCs and landlocked countries, such as Nepal, the Lao government may 
profitably refer to advantageous WTO S&DT provisions to facilitate and expedite its 
accession process and obtain more favorable terms of accession, such as generous transition 
periods for the implementation of certain WTO agreements. Lao PDR may consider the 
option of delaying accession to mitigate the negative effects of harsh requests of WTO 
demandeurs and the assumption of unwelcome obligations. Moreover, whether in the status 
of an observer during accession or a Member after accession, Lao PDR should actively 
unite with other landlocked countries and LDCs to advance collectively their special needs 
and priorities in TF and other areas of mutually concern currently under discussion in WTO 
forums, rather than passively accepting stipulated WTO rules which insufficiently protect 
their national interests. 
Regional Aspects 
Regional cooperation and integration clearly plays an important role in Lao 
PDR’s integration into the global economy. Lao PDR may address constraints in CB 
through regional cooperation and integration or networking in order to facilitate WTO 
accession, the so-called “regional approach”. That approach specifically requires regional 
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 organizations or networks to give priority to information dissemination, human resources 
development and institutional enhancement to aid Laos’ domestic reforms and integration 
into the global economy. Perhaps most important among these regional organizations are 
ASEAN and GMS.   
 
Because of its landlockedness and status as an LDC, Lao PDR is one of three 
countries which have recently acceded to ASEAN in Southeast Asia. The other two 
countries are Vietnam and Cambodia. However, these two other countries already have 
successfully acceded to the WTO. So, ASEAN should facilitate Laos’ accession through 
preparing the Lao government in its responses to WPAL requests and questions as well as 
through offering training on the WTO agreements relevant to the Lao accession. Other 
ASEAN members may provide Laos’ negotiators basic multilateral negotiation skills and 
relevant information and lay a foundation for policy reforms that are WTO-supportive.
52  
 
Moreover, Laos’ WTO accession may benefit from Lao PDR’s implementation and 
further negotiation of ASEAN rules itself. In this sense, ASEAN should pro-actively strive 
towards final establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community outlined in ASEAN 
Vision 2020, aiming to create ASEAN single market in which there is free flow of goods, 
services, investment and a freer flow of capital. Specifically, that includes instituting new 
mechanisms and measures to strengthen the implementation of AFTA, AFAS and AIA; 
accelerating regional integration in transportation, agricultural products, etc. Under AFTA, 
Lao PDR should be monitored to implement its tariff reductions in the Inclusion List into 
the 0-5 percent range not later than 2008. Also, ASEAN should propel simplification and 
streamlining of Laos’ customs procedures and practices in line with the WTO Agreement 
on Customs Valuation, such as the adoption of the “single window” approach. Moreover, 
the West-East Corridor of the Mekong Basin should be promoted within the ASEAN 
Mekong Basin Development Cooperation scheme. In addition, ASEAN may facilitate 
Laos’ transportation development through a series of regional agreements.
53 ASEAN 
should strictly follow the IAI programme as well as its current six-year Work Plan (July 
2002 – June 2008) for Lao PDR. Under IAI, ASEAN-6 should observe their obligations to 
provide assistance to Lao PDR in various forms to reduce the development gap between 
                                                 
52 See United Nations, The Doha Development Agenda: Perspectives from the ESCAP Region 252, available 
at http://www.unescap.org/tid/publication/t&ipub2278.asp (last visited 10 September 2007). 
53 Such agreements include ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit, Ha Noi, 
16 December 1998; ASEAN Transport Action Plan 2005-2010; Protocol 1 - Designation of Transit Transport 
Routes and Facilities and its Annex of List of Transit Transport Routes, Bangkok, 8 February 2007, available 
at http://www.aseansec.org/7365.htm (last visited on 14 September 2007). 
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 Lao PDR and ASEAN-6. The IAI Work Plan has identified four priority areas, namely 
infrastructure development, human resource development, information and communication 
technology and promoting regional economic integration.
54    
 
Also, Lao PDR is a member of GMS – a program of subregional economic 
cooperation established with the ADB’s assistance. First of all, GMS countries, including 
China, may take collective action to support Laos’ WTO accession. Besides, until now, five 
aspects of initiatives have been launched,
55 which are more or less intended to promote 
Laos’ international integration and accession. The focused here is on the Cross-Border 
Transport Agreement, or CBTA. Implementation of CBTA should actively pursued by 
GMS, because it includes the following elements which would move Laos’ domestic policy 
and law formulation in directions which are more consistent with WTO rules on TF before 
2007/2008: 
i.  single-stop/single-window customs inspection,   
ii.  cross-border movement of persons (i.e., visas for persons engaged in transport 
operations),  
iii.  transit traffic regimes, including exemptions from physical customs inspection, 
bond deposit, escort, and agriculture and veterinary inspection,   
iv.  requirements that road vehicles will have to meet to be eligible for cross-border 
traffic,  
v.  exchange of commercial traffic rights and   
vi.  infrastructure, including road and bridge design standards, road signs, and signals.
56  
International Aspects   
Lao PDR receives various sources of support for its domestic reforms and 
international integration from international organizations as well as other agencies, among 
which UNESCAP
57, which serves as the Secretariat for the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement 
                                                 
54 See the details on AIA and its current Work Plan at http://www.aseansec.org/14683.htm (last visited on 14 
September 2007). 
55 Those are Core Environment Program, Cross-Border Transport Agreement, Phnom Penh Plan for 
Development Management, GMS Energy Strategy, Working Group on Agriculture. See those details at 
http://www.adb.org/GMS/ (last visited on 14 September 2007).   
56 See the details on CBTA at http://www.adb.org/GMS/Cross-Border/default.asp (last visited on 14 
September 2007). 
57 UNESCAP, as the regional branch of the United Nations for Asia an the Pacific, has set up a special body 
on LDCs and landlocked developing countries, and has implemented a number of CB/TA project directly 
relevant to Laos’ accession and integration. See details available at http://www.unescap.org/tid/projects.asp 
(last visited on 15 September 2007) 
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 (APTA, previously the Bangkok Agreement signed in 1975). APTA is a preferential trade 
agreement which includes, among others, China, India and Lao PDR. After three rounds of 
multilateral negotiations, Lao PDR has received many preferential and general tariff 
concessions from other members. Such concessions have significantly promoted Laos’ 
exports to China.
58 Lao PDR may therefore continue to take an active part in deepening this 
unique agreement during future rounds.   
Finally, Laos’ reform and integration should be mutually supported by broad-based 
participation of different international organizations and other agencies. Such an 
organizational approach has been a proven success in the implementation of the APA. In 
the APA, different UN agencies (such as the General Assembly, Secretary-General, 
UNCTAD, UNESCAP), World Bank, the regional commissions and other relevant 
international and regional/subregional organizations have positively cooperated in the 
implementation process. The APA experience could be replicated with respect to other 
programmes and measures designed to facilitate Laos’ domestic and trade policy reforms. 
Currently, there are various plans, projects, etc, in TA/CB or in other areas covering Laos’ 
public sector governance, reform of state-owned enterprises and the financial sector, trade 
reforms, private sector initiatives, etc. These are supported by the ADB, EC, ITC, UNDP, 
World Bank, Australia, France, Singapore, and the US, among others. Such TA measures 
should be expanded and coordinated in the future. Moreover, such cooperating agencies 
and donor governments should pay particular attention to the need to arouse awareness of 
the private sector and improve communications with the private sector in order to better 










                                                 
58 Statistics shows China, as the only country importing one product offered concession in the Second and 
Third Round of negotiation from Lao PDR, has achieved an increasing share of such importation versus 
China’s worldwide importation. See UNESCAP, Asia Pacific Trade Agreement: Implications of Exchange of 
Trade Preferences for Member and Prospective Member Countries 11, available at 
http://www.unescap.org/tid/apta/tradepref.pdf (last visited on 15 September 2007). 
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